The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. The Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. In any given Nash equilibrium, the default beliefs held by players are that the other players are playing the equilibrium strategies (or a particular subset of the equilibrium strategies in the case of multiple equilibriums). The default beliefs and equilibrium strategies in Nash equilibrium could be more narrowly defined than those allowed under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consequently, the set of equilibriums under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of the set of equilibriums under Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is widely held to be a refinement of the Nash equilibrium ( [1] , third paragraph, p. 52:
"It is not difficult to see that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is always subgame perfect, and therefore also a Nash equilibrium.").
In Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, players hold beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. The Nash equilibrium makes no such requirement and hence purportedly generates more equilibriums than the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, by not explicitly specifying the beliefs of the players, a Nash equilibrium assumes by default that the players hold certain beliefs about the other players' strategies ( [2] , fourth paragraph, p. 20). The default beliefs and equilibrium strategies in Nash equilibrium could be more narrowly defined than those allowed under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, especially when one or more players are indifferent among the equilibrium strategy and alternative strategies that yields equal payoff. Consequently, the set of equilibriums under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of the set of equilibriums under Nash equilibrium.
In a simultaneous game, the action of a player is not observed by the other players. Since there is no observation of action, there could not be any reaction to action. Hence, the reaction functions in a simultaneous game are best understood as some kind of beliefs, or conjectures, or "virtual reaction functions" [3, 4] . The concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is therefore more appropriate for solving simultaneous games rather than the concept of Nash equilibrium. As Nash equilibrium does not specify the beliefs of the players, beliefs, by default, fill the voids and these beliefs need not be equilibrium consistent, as is required under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consequently, the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a refinement of the Nash equilibrium but an alternative equilibrium concept.
Section two gives four examples to illustrate that perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Section three gives a formal statement. Section four concludes the paper.
Examples
For the first example, consider the game represented by the payoff matrix in Table 1 . figure 3 represents this.
In this game, player 2 is always indifferent between L and The second example is the matching pennies game. Table  2 represents its payoff matrix. Table 2 . Payoff matrix of example 2 matching pennies game 1\2 Head (y)
Let the probability that player 1 plays Head be x and the probability that player 2 plays Head be y. The unique (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is (0.5, 0.5). However, when player 1 plays x=0.5, player 2 is indifferent between the two strategies, and so y could be any value from 0 to 1. Similarly, when player 2 plays y=0.5, player 1 is indifferent among all values of x from 0 to 1. Consequently, the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is
which is a larger set than the Nash equilibrium which is x=1/2 and y=1/2.
For the third example, consider the following signaling game as represented by Figure 4 . Table 3 gives the normal form representation. There are four pure strategy Nash equilibriums, (LL, DU), (LL, DD), (RR, UD) and (RR, DD). Among these, (L, L, D, U) and (R, R, U, D) are (pure strategy) Perfect Bayesian equilibriums. There is a mixed strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). There is also another Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (
is not among the Nash equilibriums. Therefore, for this game, the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibriums is not a subset of Nash equilibriums. The above game could be represented by two extensive form games of imperfect information. In one of them, Tom moves first and Jerry moves second. There is however imperfect information on the move of Tom. In the other, Jerry moves first and then Tom moves. There is however imperfect information on the move of Jerry. The game could therefore be solved by the concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (x=1/2, pr(y=0)=1/2, pr(y=1)=1/2). Given the belief that x=1/2, Jerry is indifferent between y=0 and y=1; hence he plays pr(y=0)=1/2 and pr(y=1)=1/2. Alternatively, given that Jerry is indifferent between y=0 and y=1, it is optimal for Tom to set x=1/2. The beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium strategies, and the strategies and beliefs constitute the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. In this research, mixed strategies are not considered since the action spaces are continuous [5] . Again, for the above example, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium.
A Formal Statement
From the above examples, it is clear that the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of the Nash equilibrium. By extension, the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of a subgame perfect equilibrium as well. The reason is that a Nash equilibrium, by default, assigns some implicit beliefs about the moves of the other players. If the assumed action of the players is not uniquely optimal while the assigned belief under Nash equilibrium states that it is so, or if the assumed action of the players is not uniquely optimal and there is no Nash equilibrium, then the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of the Nash equilibrium. The following proposition formalizes this argument. 
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However, in the case when there is imperfect information or simultaneous moves, the players need to form beliefs by default about the moves of the other player. It should be reminded that this is a requirement made explicit by perfect Bayesian equilibrium but not by Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium and Bayesian Nash equilibrium [6] . Effectively, in a Nash equilibrium the player assigns probability one to the assumed optimal actions of the other players that he is responding optimally to. Then, the above condition makes sense only if, by default, it means 
Given that there is more than one optimal action for player i , the default belief is narrower than that under Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as it means 
, then there is no Nash equilibrium though the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists.
In sum, a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, by explicitly requiring that the players hold beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of the other players, produces equilibriums that are not a subset of the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a refinement of the Nash equilibrium but an alternative equilibrium concept.
Conclusions
What is the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and its many refinements? Why are there are so many refinements of Nash equilibrium? [6] The Nash equilibrium, by leaving the beliefs of agents undefined, results in beliefs by default: believing that the other player will play the Nash equilibrium strategy given that one is playing one's own corresponding Nash equilibrium strategy. However, as shown in the examples given, this assumption could at times be unreasonable. One of the problems it creates is that there might be multiple equilibriums. The myriad refinements and alternative equilibrium concepts are formulated to solve these problems. The refinements try to tighten up the definition and rule out unreasonable equilibriums and their default beliefs. They typically have smaller sets of equilibriums than the Nash equilibrium, as they have more stringent definitions. The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium explicitly requires players to hold beliefs about other players' strategies that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies being played. However, these equilibrium-consistent beliefs need not be a subset of the default beliefs implicit in Nash equilibriums, especially when the player is indifferent among courses of actions. Consequently, The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a refinement of the Nash equilibrium but an alternative equilibrium concept.
